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In this paper, I explore how the announcement of a peacekeeping operation (PKO) impacts the
use of force by rebels. I hypothesize that after a mandate is passed in the United Nations Security
Council (UNSC) but before peacekeepers are on the ground, insurgents will strategically increase
their use of force on the battle field and against civilians in order to maximize access to resources
before the PKO arrives. A key element of this argument is the nature of a multidimensional PKO
which has a mandate justified by Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Under Chapter VII, intervention
requires minimal consent from host states to establish an operation. This minimal consent translates
to the state’s ability to withhold consent at a local level, dictating where the UN operation is
allowed to position itself. Thus, the state has the ability to move an operation into regions where
state authority is contested, and bring that territory back under state control. In this fashion,
UN intervention can be manipulated by the governing group, and could lead rebels to see UN
intervention as a boost in power of their rival. This causes insurgents to try to commit more acts of
violence as they strategically push for more territorial control within the country from which they
receive new recruits, monetary resources, and natural resources before the UN operation arrives.
I test this theory using a regression discontinuity design looking specifically at the three month
window after UN PKO announcement but before boots are on the ground in order to analyze
whether or not rebels increase battlefield violence and violence against civilians in this time period.
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INTRODUCTION
On July 31st of 2007, the UN passed a resolution to send a peacekeeping force to the Darfur region
of Sudan. This peacekeeping operation was announced in the wake of a tenuous peace agreement
between state forces of Sudan and one rebel faction in the region, providing just enough justification
for a peacekeeping operation to take place. With tenuous support from the state of Sudan for the
operation, the United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) was created with the goal
of civilian protection. The mission was a multidimensional operation where peacekeepers could
intervene with the use of force in order to secure peace. Only one day after the announcement of
the peacekeeping operation, rebel use of force dramatically increased. Pressing to gain territory and
resources quickly, Sudanese rebels attacked Adila, a town linked to Darfur through its railroad. In
this one-day offensive, battlefield deaths doubled from their total in the previous three months. The
rebel coalition captured fifty government vehicles and gained important strategic ground against the
government. In this case, the announcement of a UN peacekeeping operation did not prevent more
violence on the battlefield from occurring. In fact, could the announcement of a UN Peacekeeping
Operation (PKO) and the rebel offensive be connected? Could the announcement have actually
increased the levels of violence perpetrated by rebels?
Previous literature on UN intervention has focused on how the presence of a UN PKO affects the
use of force among belligerents. Studies that determine when a PKO effectively decreases battlefield
deaths, decreases civilian casualties, and increases the longevity of peace after conflict shape the
time period and scope of UN intervention. All of this research focuses on the period of time after
peacekeeper arrival. One area of research that remains to be explored is how the announcement of
intervention, before peacekeepers arrive, affects belligerent use of force. The mere announcement of
third party intervention in conflict has the ability to shape strategic motivations of the state and
rebel groups. In different scenarios, announcements of third party intervention incentivize both the
state and rebels to increase their use of force before intervention (Kuperman, 2008; Kathman and
Wood, 2011; Wood, Kathman, and Gent, 2012). Could the announcement of peacekeeping have
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a similar effect? Could the nature of the intervention itself cause governments or rebel groups to
increase their use of force before intervention? If there is such an effect, understanding how the
announcement of a PKO changes rebel and government strategy could reinforce the importance of
the immediacy of peacekeeper deployment and inform commanders of the conflict environment they
step into. Analyzing the period of time after peacekeeping announcement, when the arrival of an
operation is imminent, would answer these questions.
In this paper, I explore the timing of peacekeeping intervention as it impacts levels of conflict.
I argue that after the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passes a mandate but before
peacekeepers arrive, insurgents will strategically increase their use of force on the battlefield and
against civilians in order to maximize access to resources before the PKO arrives. A key element of
this argument is the nature of a multidimensional PKO that has a mandate justified under Chapter
VII of the UN Charter. Under Chapter VII, intervention requires minimal consent from host states
to establish an operation. This minimal consent translates to the state’s ability to position an
operation in regions where state authority is contested, and bring that territory back under state
control. In this fashion, the state can manipulate UN intervention, and could lead rebels to see a
PKO as a boost in power of the state. This causes insurgents to try to strategically control territory
within the country from which they receive new recruits, monetary resources, and natural resources
before the UN operation arrives.
I use a regression discontinuity design at the state-day unit of analysis on the ninety days
leading up to a peacekeeping operation and the ninety days following the mission, to estimate the
effect of UN intervention on use of force. There is little reason to believe the announcement of a
peacekeeping operation has a strategic influence on rebel use of force. I conclude that while the
announcement of the UN PKO might not have an impact itself on use of force, a window of time
might exist before intervention when rebels have a strong reason to believe PKO intervention will
occur that might cause an increase in violence before the time-span included in this analysis.
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LITERATURE REVIEW
A broad range of studies indicate that peacekeeping benefits recipient countries in the long run.
Once selection effects are controlled for, peacekeeping decreases the odds of civil war recurrence
through several mechanisms (Fortna, 2004b). Peacekeeping increases the costs of returning to
conflict, allows belligerents to credibly signal, and decreases the probability of small incidents
and skirmishes dissolving back into conflict. Sambanis (2008) further parses out these findings
through determining when PKOs foster a more lasting peace. He finds that mission effectiveness in
achieving long-term peace is contingent upon the mandate of a mission. Mandates that focus on
determining the causes of hostility and work within local capacities to change the existing situation
more effectively secure peace (Sambanis, 2008).
Other studies that focus on short-run effectiveness compliment studies on the long-term effects.
Doyle and Sambanis (2000) discover that peacekeeping operations reduce more immediate violence
if their mandates are more extensive. Peacekeeping is even more effective in the short term when it
increases the costs of conflict and reduces commitment problems faced by belligerents. However,
this only applies when the PKO operates at full capacity in terms of boots on the ground (Hultman,
Kathman, and Shannon, 2014a). Additionally, missions with larger military troop counts decrease
civilian casualties in conflict. However, UN PKOs more successfully mitigate violence against
civilians committed by rebel groups rather than by governments, as the PKO’s continued presence
hinges upon government permission at the local level (Fjelde, Hultman, and Nilsson, 2019) .
These studies on peacekeeping’s impact on conventional and unconventional use of force address
variation in UN effectiveness in mitigating violence. However, further studies have yet to examine
how belligerents strategically escalate or deescalate conflict in response to the presence of a mission.
Furthermore, these studies examine what happens during UN intervention, but fail to take into
account what happens in the span of time between UN mission announcement and when a PKO
reaches its fullest capacity. This study attempts to fill this gap. I suggest that peacekeeping
intervention might not always cause belligerents to deescalate the use of force in response to its
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presence. In fact, under certain conditions belligerents are incentivized to escalate the use of force
before a peacekeeping operation occurs.
The literature on third party intervention offers some insight in this regard. The possibility of
both biased and unbiased third-party intervention affects strategic decisions taken by rebels and
governments when using conventional and unconventional force. The conflict management literature
speaks to the effects of these interventions by the international community in situations of mass
violence and atrocities. Kuperman (2008) identifies the moral hazard presented to rebels in the lieu
of the advent of the “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P) protocol. Governments often use genocidal
violence on sub-state secessionist entities as a way to squelch rebellion. The R2P invoked by the
international community to intervene in this kind of atrocity, gives secessionist groups reason to
believe that third-party intervention will occur on their behalf if they overtly rebel. This results
in government violence against insurgents that may not have occurred otherwise. In this way,
intervention by international organizations like the UN might increase rather than decrease violence
(Kuperman, 2008).
Additionally, intervention in mass killing may immediately increase the use of force used by
the government against a sub-state group as they try to wipe insurgents out completely. However,
intervention in genocide decreases long-term violence after intervention occurs. The international
community’s presence modifies the government’s expectation of accomplishing their goal of wiping
out their opponent (Kathman and Wood, 2011). Biased intervention also affects levels of violence
perpetrated by belligerents. When rebels have an interest in extracting resources as a source of
income and the state announces biased intervention, rebels try to secure their resources and position
vis-a-vis the government and an uptick in violence against civilians occurs (Wood, Kathman, and
Gent, 2012). Third-party biased intervention not only has implications for the cessation of conflict,
but it also has implications for rebel and government use of force. In the following section I argue
that UN peacekeeping justified under Chapter VII of the UN Charter acts like biased intervention
in favor of the state, and as such impacts the strategic use of force by rebels and governments upon
the announcement of an operation.
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INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND ON THE INITIATION OF A PEACEKEEPING
OPERATION
The charter of the UN does not specifically address when peacekeeping can and cannot occur.
However, the UNSC justifies PKOs through invoking Chapter VI and Chapter VII of the UN
Charter. Peacekeeping that occurs under Chapter VI is typically considered traditional peacekeeping
in which the UN receives strong and credible consent that all belligerent parties are committed to a
peace process. Conversely, Chapter VII peacekeeping operations deploy to “volatile post-conflict
settings where the state is not able to maintain security and public order (UN).” Under these
conditions the UN obtains more relaxed consent from belligerents, and generally, a less effective
political solution to a conflict exists. Weak host state consent is required, whereas consent by
different non-state actors is sought but not required. This kind of intervention normally occurs
when a conflict affects regional stability or entails heavy civilian targeting (UN).
In the initial phases of discussion on the conception of a peacekeeping operation, the Security
Council considers whether or not it has received consent from both parties to a conflict and the
strength of that consent. Most peacekeeping operations now occur under Chapter VII justifications,
meaning belligerents give loose consent. The UNSC, after reviewing a proposed PKO and discussing
logistics with contributing countries as well as taking an initial trip to the conflict site to determine
feasibility of a mission, votes on whether or not to pass a mandate which establishes the PKO. If the
mandate passes, the mission has three months to ramp up to full capacity. While the UNSC tries to
reach full capacity by three months, sometimes this period is extended as the UN is dependent on
successful negotiations with troop contributing countries to fill mission positions.
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THEORY
Insurgent territorial control is vital to the survival of insurgent groups for several reasons. Territorial
control provides a pool of civilians from which to draw recruits, an ability to tax civilians and gain
more monetary resources, room to conduct military training, access to natural resources in the area,
and a zone where insurgents can control civilian informants to the government (Weinstein 2007,
Arjona 2016). All of these factors lead to increased security as well as material and human resources
for the group, which help insurgents to grow in strength against the government. In this context,
more territory can be won through overt use of force against the government, exerting force over
civilian populations, or more covert control of civilian populations (Weinstein 2007). However, the
arrival of a PKO threatens rebel ability to pursue territorial control.
Most peacekeeping intervention occurs in a conflict environment when rebel groups pose a
significant threat to the government (Fortna 2008). As a result, at the time of UN intervention,
insurgent group control threatens the host state’s territorial control. Under legal justification of
Chapter VII of the UN Charter, when the UN passes the initial mandate and sends in peacekeepers,
it becomes significantly more difficult for rebel groups to use conventional force in order to win
more territory relative to the government. This happens for several reasons. First, the UN more
successfully decreases violence when rebel groups are strong compared to the government (Hultman,
Kathman, and Shannon 2014). This suggests that the UN is better at mitigating violence and
potentially minimizing the effective use of conventional force by rebels to gain more territory from
the government, even when rebel groups are strong.
Second, rebel groups do not have a say as to where a peacekeeping operation chooses to set up
base nor do they have the ability to control the movement of peacekeepers within the state. Since
the state has the power to place the mission through withholding domestic consent in certain areas,
insurgent groups now have to worry about the ability of a third party to stop the effectiveness
of conventional use of force to gain territory. In this story, full implementation of a Chapter VII
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PKO means the probability of the government winning territory goes up, while the probability of
insurgents winning territory goes down.
Since the UN must receive only minimal consent from the host-state in order to intervene
in a conflict, according to Chapter VII, the state’s ability to withhold local consent plays out in
the following manner. Peacekeepers rely on consent from the state to move around and set up
bases in different parts of the state. If the state withholds domestic consent in certain regions, the
host government controls the movement of peacekeeping forces within the state. This gives the
state significantly more power over the way the PKO enforces peace. In contested territory, the
government might strategically allow UN forces to suppress insurgents through enforcing peace
agreements. In places where the government wants to gain more territory from insurgents, it
might ban peacekeepers from entry. In this manner, the government might feel less threatened by
the insurgent group once a peacekeeping intervention has occurred, and it might even have the
opportunity to win back more of its territory from the insurgents.
Rebels know, due to the reasons expressed above, that once intervention occurs their probability
of winning more territory decreases, while the probability of the government’s ability to gain territory
increases. Since rebel groups foresee their probability of securing future payoffs decreasing upon
mission announcement, they factor in this future difficulty in the present. This future difficulty
makes it more appealing for rebels to fight in the present and secure their position vis-a-vis the
government. In light of these considerations, in the time between when the UN establishes a PKO
and before it reaches its maximum capacity, one way non-state actors will try to gain contested
territory is through direct confrontation with state forces on the battlefield. This would lead to an
increase in the use of conventional force to try and secure their position before peacekeeping occurs.
The goal for the rebel group, during this time period, is to win as much territory as possible before
the state experiences the benefits of a UN PKO. As a result of this logic, I argue:
• H1: After the establishment of a UN PKO justified under Chapter VII of the UN Charter
but before intervention occurs, non-state actors party to an ongoing conflict will increase their
conventional use of force.
Not only will the insurgent group try to gain territory through direct confrontation with the
state, but UN intervention will also influence insurgent strategies concerning civilian targeting.
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Insurgent groups will commit more indiscriminate acts of violence against civilians when they play
an extractive role and when short-term resource interests motivate their behavior. In other words,
indiscriminate violence against civilians is most likely to occur when rebels have short time horizons
and attempt to capture territory quickly (Weinstein, 2007). Additionally, Wood, Kathman, and
Gent (2012) find that rebels will escalate the use of force against civilians shortly before governments
receive reinforcement from third party biased interventions in favor of the state, since resource
extraction capabilities are under threat. In this scenario, rebel groups will try to make a push to
solidify their ability to continue to fight against the increased strength of the government through
extracting more resources through territorial control. UN intervention creates shorter time horizons
for rebel groups, as, when in full force, it puts on hold the extraction of resources. Rebels put in
this situation will intensify their push for territorial control and as a result:
• H2: After the establishment of a UN PKO but before intervention occurs, insurgent groups
will escalate violence against civilians.
The scope of this paper is one-sided and deals specifically with the rebel’s response to the
announcement of peacekeeping. While I do not formally hypothesize about how the announcement of
peacekeeping affects the government use of force, I do have some theoretical expectations. Previous
research indicates that UN PKOs reduce more violence against civilians committed by non-state
actors. Since the PKO does not receive consent from the government at the local level and the
government controls where the peacekeeping operation can and cannot intervene, the mission’s
exposure to government-led civilian targeting is limited (Fjelde, Hultman, and Nilsson, 2019). This
is consistent with the aforementioned expectation that governments can still exercise a considerable
amount of territorial control and even make gains in this regard with a PKO present.
Consistent with my theory, if UN intervention works to benefit the state, I expect the state to
comply with the expectations of the peacekeeping operation before the arrival of the mission. Under
Chapter VII, commitment to the peace process demonstrated by the opposing sides must exist. The
UN is much more lenient when verifying rebel commitment to a peace process as rebel groups can be
highly fragmented and difficult to control. However, before the mission has sunk costs in the form
of boots on the ground, it might be more likely to pull out if it observes a government use of force
in violation of a peace agreement. For this reason, and since the strategic reservation of domestic
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consent by the government means that the UN operation can work to bring rebel territory back
under government control, I suspect that the government will keep its use of force against rebels and
civilians low during the three-month time period before the UN has sunk costs into intervention.
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UNAMID EXAMPLE
The mission in Darfur provides an example of this process due to the low levels of consent for the
mission given by the host-state and the way the government of Sudan limited the mission’s access to
parts of the region. Darfur is a region of Sudan that had remained autonomous until 1916 when it
was coopted into Sudan. Starting in 2000 several uprisings took place in the region which sought to
overthrow the state. The state responded to these uprisings with the use of force, and this conflict
reached its peak in 2003. At this time, different rebel groups within Darfur joined forces with the
rebel group, Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), who then supplied them with
arms (Lanz, 2013).
At this time, the government began peace talks with the SPLM but also sent troops into
Northern Darfur with the intent of targeting the rebel base in the region. Between 2003 and 2004
it is estimated that 400,000 people fell victim to violence. This crisis attracted the attention of
the international community, and many non-profit groups already in the region pushed for more
governmental involvement, asking that the international community recall the responsibility to
protect (R2P) and failed intervention in Rwanda. This pressure caused governments like the U.S.
to name what had happened as genocide. This labeling meant the international community had
a responsibility to act. The international community chose to intervene through a PKO whose
mandate passed on July 31, 2007 (Lanz, 2013).
Chapter VII of the UN charter offered legal justification for the mission, and it fell under
the responsibility to protect civilians. The PKO received consent from the government of Sudan,
however, once troops deployed it became evident how weak that consent was. In May of 2006 the
Sudanese government had signed the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) with a smaller rebel group
that had broken with other insurgents. To the UN this served as a “political solution” to the
conflict and provided grounds for intervention. The mandate was constructed around upholding this
agreement. However, belligerents signed this agreement under intense international pressure. UN
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forces started to arrive in January of 2008 with the agreement already in shambles. Peacekeepers
entered into a difficult environment (Lanz, 2013).
Additionally, peacekeepers faced intense host-state scrutiny and control for the entirety of the
mission. Sudan controlled the number of visas they allowed the UN to have for peacekeepers and
thus controlled the size of the mission. Darfur is a geographically large and densely populated area.
With a restricted seventy-five percent operating capacity in terms of troop numbers, peacekeepers
had difficulty controlling the vast expanse. The host-state government also subjected peacekeepers
to a curfew. In several cases the UN was criticized for not appropriately investigating cases or
protecting civilians that fell victim to government brutality. Finally, when the Sudanese army
planned to raid towns in South Darfur that harbored rebels, the government even asked the UN to
vacate the towns. While the UN in this case negotiated for the ability to stay in the area where
government violence against civilians could have taken place, they helped to negotiate a settlement
between the rebels and the government where the rebels were still forced to leave. As a result of
these factors, caused by weak host-state consent, the effectiveness of the mission was severely limited
(Lanz, 2013).
During the mission, it is clear that state forces of Sudan controlled the mission’s free movement
in the country through withholding local consent. However, did rebel groups expect UN intervention
to benefit the state even before it arrived and change rebel strategy accordingly? Looking over
data ninety days before peacekeeping announcement and ninety days after, the number of battle
deaths occurring in the time period after peacekeeping announcement more than doubled from the
previous time period. The battle initiated by rebel groups the day after peacekeeping announcement
provides further evidence that rebels were concerned with securing territory for the purpose of
solidifying access to resources before the operation arrived. In this attack, rebel groups launched
an offensive on a town that connected Darfur to the nation’s capital through its rail line. This
could have taken place to cut government forces off from access to resources through this railroad.
Additionally, in this battle, rebel forces secured fifty government vehicles providing them with
greater mobility throughout the region. This attack provides some support for my argument (AP,
2007). Rebels forces seemed intent on securing resources through the use of force in the wake of UN
PKO announcement and before the mission arrived.
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RESEARCH DESIGN AND DATA
In order to test these hypotheses, I use data from the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset. This
dataset captures individual events of organized violence perpetrated by state or non-state actors
against combatants and civilians. It not only captures these violent events at the state-level but
disaggregates them to the region and PRIO-Grid level. For this analysis I will aggregate observations
in this dataset to the state-day unit of analysis. The PRIO-Grid divides the globe into fifty-five by
fifty-five kilometer sections. If an organized violent event occurs in one of the grids, it becomes a
data point in this data-set. I aggregate these data points based off of the state they occurred in and
the day on which the occurred. I examine the universe of peacekeeping operations that are justified
under Chapter VII of the UN convention between 1999 and 2018. I chose this time-frame since the
bulk of UN PKOs occurring under Chapter VII did not begin until the turn of the 21st century.
The UCDP data-set reports the accuracy of the recorded date of a violent event. They use a
categorical variable ranging from one to five to capture the accuracy of reporting. A one means the
date when the event occurred is known, and a five means only the year in which the event occurred
is known. For the purposes of this study, I use events that received a one to four ranking, where at
a minimum, the month the event occurred is known. I did this because I aim to capture only the
three months before mission announcement and the three months after announcement. In Figure 1,
I have included a histogram of frequency of each rating in the dataset. I dropped a minimal number














Figure 1: Histogram of Date Precision
The research design I employ for this analysis is a regression discontinuity (RD) design. This
research design allows me to exploit the randomness surrounding the timing of a UN PKO an-
nouncement and observe whether or not the rebel use of force increases after the cut-point date
through observing variation in my dependent variable battle field and civilian deaths. With regards
to battle deaths, I cannot differentiate between confrontations where the state initiates violence
and others where the rebel group initiates violence. As a result, I use the sum of all battle deaths
occurring in an event as the dependent variable for testing hypothesis one. For the analyses of my
second hypothesis, I rely on the dependent variable civilian deaths. I cannot filter this data by
whether state or non-state actors perpetrated this violence. I have included a table of the descriptive
statistics for both of these variables.
Additionally, I create a variable which is the number of days from the peacekeeping operation
announcement for each event in each state that receives a mission. I isolate the ninety days before
the mission announcement and ninety days after and look at events of organized violence in this time
period. I will analyze the difference in the average levels of violence against civilians in PRIO-grids
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Battle Field Deaths Civilian Deaths
Min. 0 0
1st Qu. 0 0
Median 0 0
Mean 0.8442 .895
3rd Qu. 0 0
Max. 217 200
N 2715 2715
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
where the state receives UN peacekeeping and the time when they do not. The difference at
the cut-point will communicate whether or not rebels escalate the use of force after UN PKO
announcement. This three-month window is my period of interest because during this time rebels
and government can re-position themselves or solidify their existing position, if they choose to,
before the operation arrives. Three months is an institutional goal for when the UNSC hopes to
have the first boots on the ground after passing the mission mandate. This institutional goal defines
the period of time I use in the research design.
This design is useful because I utilize the ninety days before the announcement of peacekeeping
intervention as a control group and the ninety days after announcement as a treatment group. I
compare states and their levels of violence each day before and after announcement. In this way,
RD design mimics an experimental design with a randomized control group and a randomized trial
group. This allows me to avoid potential confounding variables in a way that a Poisson or negative
binomial regression would not. The day the UNSC chooses to vote on the resolution to pass a
peacekeeping operation should be independent from the levels of violence occurring the ninety days
before announcement. This is because it takes months to establish a peacekeeping operation, and
while levels of violence determine whether or not a PKO gets established in the first place, levels
of violence should not determine the exact day the UNSC votes on these issues. In this way the
treatment, UN announcement, is administered randomly and is independent from levels of violence
in the ninety days leading up to the PKO announcement. Comparing the same countries in time
periods before and after intervention ensures treatment and control groups that are very similar to
one another and differ only in their levels of the dependent variable due to the treatment.
While we might see an upward or downward trend in how much violence is observed during the
time period in question, this research design allows me to isolate the effect of the announcement
14
itself on the level of violence. It does this through comparing the same grid cells and their violence
right before the announcement and right after the announcement. The assumption is that the day
right before announcement should not be different from one day after announcement. The only
difference between those days should be that the announcement of a UN peacekeeping operation is
made public. Taking observations immediately to either side of the cut-point and estimating the
average difference in levels of violence between both these points, allows me to see whether or not
the announcement of a peacekeeping operation drives an increase in violence in the days following
the announcement. If there is significant discontinuity at the cut-point then the announcement
more than likely causes this discontinuity. If there is continuity at the cut-point, then, more than
likely, an increase in violence already existed before the announcement of the operation. In this way,
I get closer to isolating causality and ensure that I do not attribute an upward trend in conflict to
the announcement if the upward trend occurred regardless of the presence of an announcement. As
a result, this research design provides a more rigorous test of my hypothesis, and gives good reason
to believe that a causal relationship exists if my results are as hypothesized. If I had used a poisson
or negative binomial regression with a dichotomous variable indicating the ninety days following
mission announcement, I could not exploit the similarity in the days surrounding the cut-point, and
the effect size of the dichotomous variable could reflect an upward trend of violence in the data
present regardless of the announcement.
In order to ensure the internal validity of this test, it needs to pass several checks. First, the
treatment, PKO announcement, cannot be caused by the cut-point, the date of announcement. This
is a simple expectation to fulfill. While the assignment to treatment does occur on this day, the
day this occurs on is not systematically related to the probability of a state receiving a mission.
Belligerent parties might be aware that they are more likely to receive a peacekeeping operation on
one date more than another because the UNSC is actually meeting on that day, however, certainty
of receiving a mission is not secured until the UNSC actually votes in favor of the mission. The
veto power of states in the UNSC makes it so that belligerents are never certain they will receive
a peacekeeping operation on a certain date since it only takes one major power to destroy the
possibility of a state receiving a mission. Second, receiving the treatment must be completely
dependent on whether or not the state is past the cut-point. For our sample, this is true. If
each state is past the cut-point we can verify that the treatment has been administered as PKO
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announcements are made the day that missions are established. Finally, nothing other than the
administration of the treatment, UN PKO announcement, can be discontinuous at the cut-point.
In order to verify that nothing else is changing at the date when the peacekeeping operation is
announced, I run several robustness checks explained further in a later section of the paper.
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RESULTS
The first way to assess if there is a discontinuity around the cut-point is through a simple scatter plot.
This scatter plot for battlefield deaths is displayed in Figure 2. Contrary to my hypothesis, it seems
that if there is a discontinuity in battlefield deaths after the announcement of the peacekeeping
operation, then there might be less battlefield deaths. However, this discontinuity is difficult to























Figure 2: Scatter Plot of Battle Field Deaths
In Figure 3 I use a nonparametric regression discontinuity design which calculates a localized
linear regression to fit the data and reveal any discontinuity at the cut point. For the number of
battle deaths and civilian deaths I log transform and add one to the counts since both counts are
skewed towards zero. This model assumes randomization of groups around the cut-point and finds
the average difference in battle deaths right before and after the cut-point. It calculates average
battle-deaths from all the data points which fall within particular day intervals before and after
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announcement. The length of day interval, referred to as a bin, averages all the data points that fall
within it. The appropriate bin size is calculated using an evenly spaced variance method. With this














Figure 3: Regression Discontinuity Design: Battle Field Deaths
Figure 3 displays that upon UN peacekeeping announcement the number of battlefield deaths
seemingly decreases, signaling a decrease in belligerence by rebels and the government. Less than
one fourth of the count of battle field deaths occur after peacekeeping announcement than before
the announcement. It seems that, contrary to Hypothesis 1, UN peacekeeping announcements
might actually decrease rebel use of force. However, when examining the treatment effect and the
confidence interval on the difference between means at the cut-point it seems evident that there is
no statistical significance in these findings, and provides evidence of a null effect.




0.734 [-0.211 , 0.299]
Table 2: Model 1 Results for Battle Field Deaths
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I could find a null effect for several reasons. One decision that could be driving these effects is
the aggregation of all battle deaths in the given time period. Since I was unable to differentiate
between battles where the government had initiated conflict and battles where rebels had initiated
conflict, it could be that government decisions to not initiate battles during this time period are
driving this effect. Governments might not initiate conflict on the battle field after UN intervention
announcement for several reasons. First, the government can use the peacekeeping intervention in
its favor and does not need to solidify its position vis-a-vis the rebel organization before intervention.
During intervention, the government is still able to use conventional force to win territory, keeping
the PKO in the dark through strategically withholding local consent. Additionally, it benefits from
the ability to place troops in areas where it faces security threat. Second, during this time span,
before the UN has sunk significant costs into the mission and can easily pull-out, the government
has an incentive to behave in accordance with the loose peace agreement the UN had both parties
agree to before intervention, to ensure UN intervention actually takes place. For these reasons we
might see government aggression going down in the time period after intervention which might be
conflating the testing of Hypothesis 1.
Calculating the impact of the treatment of UN peaekeeping announcement on use of force
against civilians by rebels was similar to the process laid out above. One significant difference is
that I was able to control for who initiated the violence. Filtering the data and removing organized
violence perpetrated against civilians by government actors, I find that at the cut-point it does
appear that the UN operation announcement increases the levels of violence committed by rebels
against civilians. The basic scatter plot in Figure 4 demonstrates a decrease in the use of force
against civilians before peacekeeping announcement, and a steadily higher observation of civilian






















Figure 4: Scatter Plot of Civilian Deaths
The comparison of averages represented in Figure 5 captures that civilian victimization seems to
increase at the cut-point. This tentatively suggests that a UN peacekeeping announcement increases
levels of civilian victimization in support of Hypothesis 2. This increase in civilians targeting
















Figure 5: Regression Discontinuity Design: Civilian Deaths
These findings also seem to be statistically significant at the .05 level. By transforming the
coefficient, taking into account the previous transformation of the dependent variable, we find that
the announcement of a PKO seems to increase the counts of civilian victimization by a little over
eighteen percent. Examination of the coefficient reveals that peacekeeping announcement leads to
an overall increase of civilian victimization following the announcement of a PKO.




0.013 [0.042 , 0.350]
Table 3: Model 2 Results for Civilian Deaths
Since I used a non-parametric design which applies more weight to observations around the
cut-point, I also must account for what occurs when those observations are not taken into account.
In other words, on the right side of the cut-point generally and not taking into account the days
right after a peacekeeping announcement, are there significantly higher levels of violence than period
to the right of the cut-point? In order to calculate this, I ran designs eliminating the five days
surrounding the cut-point, ten days, and twenty days. Eliminating the five days before and after the
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cut-point yield no statistically significant difference before and after treatment. This reveals that
at the days surrounding the cut-point the peacekeeping operation might have an impact, however,
in the following time period, the announcement has a null effect. This casts doubt on my causal
mechanism. If rebels were to increase their use of force surrounding announcement according to my
hypotheses, they should do so for the ninety days until the peacekeeping operation arrives. I find














































Figure 6: Eliminating Observations Around the Cut-point
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ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
In order to address internal validity concerns of this empirical strategy, I have included a robustness
check to provide evidence that there is no other kind of discontinuity caused by the selection of
the cut-point. Substantively, this means determining whether or not the date on which mission
announcement occurs has an impact on the outcome of battle field deaths or civilian use of force.
If for example, on the date of intervention, a national holiday like an independence day, occurred
which sparked protesting or rioting every year on that date, then the date itself might explain the
discontinuity we see in the model rather than the announcement of a mission.
To confirm that the date is substantively insignificant in explaining fatalities, I construct the
same data set for the the year prior to intervention and run the RD design on this lagged dataset. I
find no statistical significance in any of the results from one year prior to intervention announcement.
This provides evidence that the date itself is not driving results.








0.596 [-0.153 , 0.266]
Table 4: Robustness Checks RDD One Year Prior to Intervention Announcement
Finally, in order to ensure that intervention in one state is not driving the results of my models,
I conduct RD on states individually which have enough data points to successfully run an RD.
For battle field deaths I find that in most cases, even those where RD is not possible, there does
not seem to be one case that is disproportionately affecting results. However, one case, Burundi,
does seem like it could be driving results as the difference at the cut-point is more than double
other differences in means in countries from the RD design. This could indicate that something
uncontrolled for is occurring on or surrounding the intervention announcement date in Burundi that









































































Figure 7: RDD Individual States Battle Field Deaths
In the case of civilian fatalities I ran the same robustness check. Similarly, in most cases, a
single state does not seem to be disproportionately affecting results. However, one case that could
potentially be impacting results is the Central African Republic since results at the cut-point are
nearly quadruple other differences in means in countries from the same RD design. This could
indicate something uncontrolled for in the Central African Republic is happening on or surrounding


























































Figure 8: RDD Individual States Civilian Deaths
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In Table 5 I have included RD results excluding both of these outlier cases. The removal of the
CAR case, when looking at civilian casualties, does change substantive results for civilian deaths
adding more uncertainty to the findings in support of Hypothesis 2.








0.062 [-0.006 , 0.239]
Table 5: Robustness Checks RDD Without Outliers
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CONCLUSION
This study contributes to the literature on UN intervention and strategic considerations made
by rebel groups in civil conflict. Theoretically, it demonstrates that the announcement of UN
intervention could cause a strategic increase in levels of force by rebels on the battlefield and against
civilians. This work expands upon the puzzling empirical observance of an increase of force by
rebels following the announcement of a UN PKO in Darfur, and bridges the gap between literature
on PKOs and the impact of intervention on belligerent strategy. Empirically, I find no support for
Hypotheses 1 and very tentative support for Hypothesis 2. Major limitations of this study include
the inability to differentiate between rebel instigated battlefield clashes and those instigated by the
government. In future research, it is essential to isolate whether or not the state or insurgent group
initiates battle field violence before and after peacekeeping announcement.
Future study should be supplemented by case studies and quantitative work done at the sub-
national level. This analysis, driven by data limitations, is multinational in scope. While this yields
more generalize-able results, the inclusion of the robustness checks demonstrates the possibility that
a single case could drive statistical significance for the population of cases. One possible avenue of
future research is difference in difference analysis at the region-month level. While the coding project
would have been too great for this current project, progress reports by the UN Secretary General
reveal specific regions the UN plans to send peacekeepers in the future. The effect of this kind of
announcement at the regional level could lend itself to difference in difference testing comparing
changes in levels of violence in the regions mentioned in the progress report to those regions not
included.
Additionally, there is a chance that the theorized effect of the certainty of peacekeeping
intervention could be set into action prior to PKO announcement. The UN could send a signal
to government and rebel forces that indicates its intent to intervene before it passes the mission’s
mandate. Potential sources of this signal could be the approval of a Technical Assessment Mission
(TAM) which occurs prior to a UNSC vote and serves as an exploratory mission by UN technicians
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to assess the viability of a PKO. The negotiation and settlement of a peace accords or cease-fire
encouraged or negotiated by the UN could also signal PKO intent. One final event which might
insight increased rebel violence before PKO intervention, is the commitment of troops by contributing
countries to the mission before UNSC establishment of the operation. All of these avenues should
be explored, and depending on the case, some might prove more relevant than others in determining
the use of force by insurgents.
Finally, while hypothesized in this paper, the effect of UN PKO announcement on the strategic
use of force by governments should also be examined. Does the government behave as expected
upon UN announcement? Is there an aforementioned signal that determines when the government
will increase or decrease the use of force against civilians? Results from the regression discontinuity
design on battlefield deaths reveal no significant impact on government use of force in the wake
of a PKO announcement. However, as stated above, a disaggregation of who instigated battles
is essential to determine whether the government increases or decreases their use of force in this
instance.
Further research in this vein could have significant policy implications. If there is a period when
UN intervention solidifies and this increases rebel use of force, then the UN might reconsider the
process it uses to establish PKOs. This could mean a shortening in the time it takes to set up
an operation and secure contributions of troops from member states, more covertly establishing
a TAM, or trying to send in troops more quickly after intervention announcement. The possible
policy implications of this research topic reinforce the need to continue to test hypotheses included
in this paper with sub-national units of analyses and examine the strategic ramifications of the
institutional process of establishing a UN PKO on conflict.
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